PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS FOR MARCH.

In a very interesting case recently tried in the Commercial
Court at London, before Collins, J., without a jury, it appeared
that a cheque was drawn in London in favor of the
Banks and
Banking,
plaintiff on the defendant bank, which carried on
Cheque,
Forged

Indorsement,

business in London and had a branch in Paris.
This cheque was specially indorsed by the plaintiff

Liability of

Banker
to a firm in London and mailed to that firm for
collection, but it never reached them. After it had been
mailed, a forged indorsement was put on the cheque, and it
was presented at the defendants' Paris branch by a person
purporting to be the last indorser, who had no account at the
defendants' banks. When presented, it was crossed generally.
The Paris branch paid the cheque, and sent it to the London
bank, which credited the Paris bank with the value. The
London bank refused to deliver the cheque to the plaintiff,
who thereupon sued it for conversion. The judge held,
(I) That by paying the cheque, forwarding it to the London
bank, and crediting their Paris bank with the value, the defendants were guilty of a conversion of the cheque in England,
and the case was therefore governed by English law; (2) That
the person who obtained payment of the cheque was not a
"customer" of the bank, within the meaning of p. 82 of the
Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, (45 & 46 Vict. c. 6I,) which
provides that "where a banker in good faith and without
negligence receives payment for a customer of a cheque crossed
generally or specially to himself, and the customer has no title
or a defective title thereto, the banker shall not incur any
liability to the true owner of the cheque by reason only of
having received such payment; and (3)That the defendants,
having paid the cheque on a forged indorsement, were not
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protected by any of the provisions of the act above cited, but
were liable for the value of the cheque under § 24 of that act,
which declares that " subject to the provisions of this act,
where a signature on a bill is forged or placed thereon without
the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be,
the forged or unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative,
and no right to retain the bill or to give a discharge therefor
or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can
be acquired through or under that signature, unless the party
against whom it is sought to retain or enforce payment of the
bill is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority:" Lacave v. Cridit Lyonnais, [1897] i Q. B. 148.
On the other hand, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has
recently decided, that the rule that when one or two innocefit
Forged
persons must suffer loss the party who did the act
Cheque,
which was the occasion of the loss ought to bear
Liability to
Depositor

it, does not apply where a depositor in a bank,
without its knowledge, had made a rubber stamp which was
a substantial facsimile of his signature, and that stamp was
stolen from his clerk by an office boy, and used in forging
cheques, which the bank paid. It accordingly held the bank
liable for the amount of the cheques: Robb v. Penna. Co., 3 Pa.
Super. Ct. 254.
This decision seems to rest upon the ground that the bank
was negligent in paying a cheque with a stamped signature;
and under the facts of the case that contention may be justified.
It does not appear that the plaintiff had ever signed a cheque
with this stamp; and no matter how well made, a stamp signature must necessarily have a regularity of outline or a broadness of impression that a pen-and-ink signature lacks. The
two, therefore, are sufficiently different to be readily distinguishable; and the bank was negligent in not scrutinizing the
cheque with sufficient care to notice that the signature was not
made as usual. But if the plaintiff had been in the habit of
signing cheques with this stamp, or had occasionally so signed
them, or if the bank had known that he possessed this stamp,
there would have been no negligence in paying the cheques,
and the bank would not have been liable.
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The Supreme Court of Mississippi lately refused to extend
the rule which permits a common carrier to refuse to accept
for passage persons who are so infirm as to require
Carriers,
Rejection of the care of an attendant, to the case of one, who,
Passengers, though blind, was strong and robust; and held
Blind Person

that the agents of the company were guilty of a
wrong in refusing to sell such a person a ticket solely on the
ground that he was blind, and not accompanied by any one:
Zaciery v. 17fobile & 0. R. R. CO., 21 So. Rep. 246.
In Turner v. St. Claik Tunnel Co., 7o N. W. Rep. 146,
where the defendant company had sent the plaintiff, who was
in its employ on the American side of the St. Clair
Conflict of
Tunnel, over to the Canadian side, to work at that
Laws
entrance, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided that the
right of the plaintiff to recover for the negligence of the defendant in allowing him to enter on dangerous work there was
governed by the laws of Canada.
An agreement to fix uniform rates of insurance has been
held to be within the meaning of a statute (McClain's Code
Conspiracy, Iowa, § 5454) which provides that "if any corporation organized under the laws of this state or
What
Constitutes
Agreement

to Fix

Insurance
Rates

any other state or country, for transacting or conducting any kind of business in this state, or any

partnership or individual, shall, create, enter into,
become a member of or party to any pool, trust, agreement,
combination or confederation with any other corporation,
partnership or individual to regulate or fix the price of oil,
lumber, coal, grain, flour, provisions, or any other commodity
or article whatever; or shall create, enter into, become a
member of or a party to any pool, agreement, combination or
confederation to fix or limit the amount or quantity of any
commodity or article to be manufactured, mined, produced, or
sold in this state, shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy to
defraud, and be subject to indictment and punishment:
Beeciley v. Mulville, (Supreme Court of Iowa,)- 70 N. W.
Rep. 107.
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In the same case the court also held that where an agreement by insurance agents to fix insurance rates provides that
all agencies shall be taken away from one who breaks it, a
member who does break it cannot recover damages, on the
ground of conspiracy to injure his business, from companies
for which he was agent under contracts permitting them to
revoke the agencies at will, and their special agents, none of
whom are members of the agreement, on an. allegation that
they, acting together to enforce the agreement, revoked the
agencies, on his refusal to observe its terms.
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department, has ruled that the act of that state of 1893, c.
Constitutional 661, § 153, as amended by the act of 1895, c. 398,
Law,
Ex Post Facto
Law

making it a misdemeanor for any person who has

been convicted of a felony to practice or attempt
to practice medicine, is ex post facto, so far as it applies by its
terms to persons convicted before it took effect, because the
illegality of the act constituting the new offense is predicated
entirely upon the commission of the former offense, without
regard to the present character of the defendant: People v.
Hawker, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 5 16.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case
of Robertson v. Baldwin, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326, held that Rev.
Involuntary Stat. U. S., §§ 4598 and 4599, which authorize
Servitude, the apprehension, imprisonment, and return on
Deserting
board of deserting seamen in the merchant service,
Seamen
are not invalidated by the prohibition of" involuntary servitude"
in the Thirteenth Amendment; basing its conclusion upon
the fact that from time immemorial the contract of a seaman
has been a peculiar one, and has always been liable to be
enforced against his will.
From this decision Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. His whole
opinion is well worth perusal, but the following contains the
kernel of it: "It will not do to say that by 'immemorial
usage' seamen could be held in a condition of involuntary
servitude, without having been convicted of crime. The
people of the United States, by an amendment of their fun-
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damental law, have solemnly decreed that, 'except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted,' involuntary servitude shall not exist in any form
in this country. The adding another exception by interpretation simply, and without amending the constitution, is,
It is a very serious matter
I submit, judicial legislation.
when a judicial tribunal, by the construction of an act of
Congress, defeats the expressed will of the legislative branch
of the government. It is a still more serious matter when the
clear reading of a constitutional provision relating to the
liberty of man is departed from in deference to what is called
' usage,' which has existed, for the most part, under monarchical and despotic governments."
The delegation to the Secretary of War, by act of Congress
of Sept. 19, 1890, (26 Stat. at Large, 453, §§ 4, 5, 7,) of
authority to direct changes in existing bridges
Navigable
over any navigable waters of the United States, or
Waters,
Control of

of bridges to be erected under legislative authority
State
of any state, for the purpose of preventing obstruction to navigation, does not affect the control of a state over navigable
waters wholly within its jurisdiction, since the act shows no
intention by Congress to exercise exclusive control over such
waters; and consequently this act did not deprive the states
of power to compel the removal or alteration of bridges erected
over such waters without authority: Lake Shore & f. S. Ry.
Co. v. State of Ohio, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recently
decided that the act of that state (Laws 189i, c. 8) which
Sale of
Adulterated
Food,

provides that from and after its passage, it shall
be unlawful for any manufacturer or vender of

Oleomargarine oleomargarine, artificial or adulterated butter,
to manufacture, or offer for sale within the limits of the state
any oleomargarine, artificial or adulterated butter, whether the
same be manufactured within or without the state, unless the
same shall be colored pink, and prescribes a penalty for a
violation thereof, is not unconstitutional: State v. lfMyers, 26
S. E. Rep. 539.
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In Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry. Co., 47 Pac. Rep.
582, the Supreme Court of California lately held, that a person
Corporations, is not entitled to vote at the meetings or elections
Meetings,
of a corporation upon stock in which he has never
Voting,
Bona Fide
Stockholder

had any interest, but which is registered in his
name for the purpose of enabling the real owner to

avoid statutory liabilities, since he is not a bonafide stockholder,
within the meaning of the statute; (Civil Code Cal., § 312.)
In the same case the court also ruled that a written agreement between purchasers of stock in a corporation that they
will for five years "retain the power to vote the
Voting
Agreement,
shares in one body, and that the vote which shall
Validity
be cast by said shares shall be determined by
ballot between them or their survivors," is a proxy, authorizing
the vote of all the stock to be cast in accordance with the
determination of the majority of the parties thereto; that the
fact that thc parties stipulated among themselves for such a
voting agreement in their contract to purchase the stock is
sufficient evidence to support it; that it is immaterial that the
voting agreement was not executed until after their bid for the
stock was made, when it was executed before they had paid
the purchase money; that it was also immaterial that a certificate for part of the stock was issued to each party; and that
such an agreement is not against public policy. Beatty, C. J.,
dissented.
There is an article on the subject of voting trusts, in 35 Am.
L. REG. (N. S.) 413.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Michigan, since the constitution of 1850 reserved to the legislature the right to alter, amend, or repeal any
Cumulative
Voting
law under which corporations might be formed, a
statute providing for representation of minority stockholders
in the directory of a corporation, by allowing them to cumulate their votes, is constitutional, as applied to a corporation
organized before its passage, but subsequent to the adoption
of the constitution, though it changes the method of voting
prescribed by its articles of incorporation; the act in question
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not being one which deprives the corporation of any substantial right: Atty.-Gen. v. Looker, 69 N. W. Rep. 929.
In a late case before the House of Lords, Salomon v. Salomon & Co., Ltd., [1897,] A. C. 22, reversing [1895] 2 Ch.
One Man
323, the appellant, a trader, sold a solvent busiCompany,
ness to a limited company with a nominal capital
of forty thousand shares, the company consisting
Liabiity,
Fraud on
only of the vendor, his wife, a daughter, and four
•Creditors
sons, who subscribed for one share each,
the terms
of sale being known to and approved by the shareholders.
In part payment of the purchase money, debentures forming
a floating security were issued to the vendor. These were
afterwards called in, and fresh debentures issued to a third
person, as security for a loan to the vendor. Twenty thousand shares were also issued to him, and were paid for out of
the purchase money. These shares gave the vendor the
power of outvoting the other shareholders. No further shares
were ever issued. All the requirements of the the Companies'
Act of 1862 were complied with. The vendor was appointed
managing director, bad times came, and the company was
wound up, and after satisfying the debentures there would not
be enough left to pay the ordinary creditors. The liquidator
counterclaimed to a suit on the debentures, alleging that the
formation of the company was a fraud on its creditors; but
their Lordships held that the proceedings were not contrary to
the true meaning of the Companies' Act of 1862; that the company was duly formed and registered, and was not a mere
"alias" or agent of or trustee for the vendor; that he was not
liable to indemnify the company against the creditors' claims;
that no fraud had been practised upon creditors or shareholders; and that neither the company, nor the liquidator
suing in its name, was entitled to rescission of the contract
of purchase. See 36 Am. L. REG. (N. S.) 18, 161.
When two members of a corporation own the entire stock,
and the corporation is indebted to each, but the indebtedness
has not been reduced to judgment, neither of
Rights of
Creditors
them has the right, as a creditor, to ask for the
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appointment of a receiver: Wallace v. Pierce-Wallace Pub. Co.,
(Supreme Court of Iowa,) 7o N. W. Rep. 216.
In The Queen v. King, [1897] I Q. B. 214, upon the trial
of an indictment for obtaining goods by false pretences, a letter
written by the defendant to the prosecutor respectCriminal
Law,
ing the goods in question was put into the hands
Evidence,
Opinion of
Witnesses as
to Meaning of
Letter

of the prosecutor, who was asked what opinion he
formed respecting the occupation or position of the

defendant upon the receipt of the letter. Counsel
for the defendant objected to this question on the ground that
the meaning and construction of the letter was a question for
the jury. This objection was overruled; and the question was
stated to the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, whether the
question and answer were admissible in evidence. That court
held, that although the question of the proper inference to be
drawn from the letter was for the jury, yet the question was
admissible to show the inference of fact drawn from it by the
prosecutor.
After his conviction, the defendant was also tried and
convicted on an indictment charging him with larceny of the
On the trial it was objected in his
Conviction of same goods.
Obtaining
behalf that, having been already convicted of
Goods under
False
Pretences
A Bar to a
Further
Prosecution
for Larceny

having obtained credit by false pretences for the
goods mentioned in the indictment, he could not
in law be guilty of stealing them. But the trial court

overruled this objection, although its reasonableness would seem to be too apparent for argument, and the
defendant was convicted. The question of the legality of this
conviction was also reserved and the court held it clearly
illegal, and quashed it.
A strike of the employes of the charterer, without grievance
or warning, and an organized and successful effort on their part
Demurrage, to prevent, by threats, intimidation and violence,
Excuse for
other laborers, who were willing to do so, from
Delay,
Strike

discharging a vessel, will excuse the charterer
for a delay in the performance of the work: Empire Transp.
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,Co. v. Pila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., (Circuit Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit,) 77 Fed. Rep. 919.
When a regularly constituted committee has called a con•vention for the sole purpose of electing delegates to the
national party convention, the convention so
Elections,
Convention,
called has no power to name a new committee
without the consent of the electors of the district:
Powers
In re Fairchild,(Court of Appeals of New York,) 45 N. E.
Rep. 943.
A certificate of nomination by a convention takes precedence of a nomination by petition or nomination papers, and
Arrangement therefore a candidate nominated in the latter way
of Ballot
is not entitled to have his name placed on the
-ballot in the column under the head of his party, in preference
to a candidate nominated by certificate, although the former
files his nomination first. But in such a case, when the statute
provides that all nominations shall be placed under the party
title, as designated by them, or if not, under some suitable
•title,-the nominee by petitions or papers is entitled to have his
name placed on the ballot under a suitable title, to be designated by the officers who prepare it: Lowery v. Davis, (Supreme Court of Iowa,) 70 N. W. Rep. 19o.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Judicial
-Court of Maine, the ballot law of that state requires the name
of a person not printed on the ballot, but whom
Ballots,
Stickers
some one wishes to vote for, to be inserted in the
blank space left for that purpose; and a sticker placed over
,one of the printed names is not a compliance with the statute:
Waterman v. Cunningham, 36 Atl. Rep. 395.
This is another instance of a strict construction of a remedial
statute, which jurists would have us believe is improper.
In the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, an
electric light company is not a manufacturing industry, within
Electric Light the meaning of a city ordinance exempting from
Companies, municipal taxation the " machinery and manufacanufacturing
turing
a
Corporations
turing apparatus
of all manufacturing industries,"
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that ordinance having been passed before the legislature
classified such companies in the incorporation laws under the
head of manufacturing companies : FrederickElectric Light &
Power Co. v. Mayor of Frederick City, 36 At. Rep. 362.
Where a natural water course is so obstructed by a dam
built on a non-resident's land, as to work an
Equity,
Jurisdiction, injury to a resident owner of adjoining land, a
Non-Residents court of equity has jurisdiction to redress the
injury: Gordon v. Warfield, (Supreme Court of Mississippi,)
21 So. Rep. 151.
A bill in equity may be maintained for the recovery of
letters written by the complainant to her son, and by her son
to her, when the former were wrongfully taken
Recoveryof
Letters
by defendant from the possession of the son, and
the latter from the possession of the complainant: Dock v.
Dock, (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,) 36 Atl. Rep. 411.
An entry in the family Bible of one whose life is insured,
though made by a person who is not a member of
Famiiy Bible the family, is admissible against the plaintiff in an
action on the policy, Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard,.
(Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,) 26 S.E. Rep. 421.
Evidence,

In an action by an architect on a quantum meruit, the evidence offered by the plaintiff as to the customary charges of
Quantum
architects for similar services is not rendered inMeruit,
competent by the defendant showing that those
Customary
Charges
customary charges originated in and conform to.
a rule established by an association of architects: Laver v.
Hotaling, (Supreme Court of California,) 47 Pac. Rep. 593.
McFarland, J., dissented.
The mere fact that a purchaser gives a check, in payment,
on a bank in which he has neither money nor credit, is not a
fraudulent representation that he has money or
False
Pretenses
credit there, so as to constitute the offense of
swindling: Brown v. State, (Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas,) 38 S. W. Rep. ioo8.
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In order to constitute the offense of forcible entry at
common law, and under those statutes which have adopted
the common law definition of that crime, the
Forcible
Entry,
entry must be accompanied by some act of actual
What Constitutes,
Entering
Uhoccupled

violence or terror directed towards the person in
possession; and, therefore bireaking and entering

HSuse
an uhoccupied house in the absence of the person
who had previously been in possession and control thereof,
and who still claimed the right to the possession, is not an
indictable offense: Lewis v. State, (Supreme Court of Georgia,)
26 S. E. Rep. 496.

An innkeeper or hotel-keeper is a guarantor for the good
conduct of all members of his househoid, ihcluding those
engaged in his service, and is liable for thefts
Innkeepers,
committed by them of the property of his guests
Liability,.
Theft by
while asleep in rooms assigned them; and the
Servant

fact that a guest is intoxicated, or that the ddor of
his room is unlocked, will not relieve the landlord of rtsponsibility: Cunningham v. Bucky, (Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia,) 26 S.E. Rep. 442.

In West of England Fire Ins. Co. v. Isaacs, [1897] I Q. B.
226, the Court of Appeal of England has affirmed the decision
Fire Insurance, of Collins, J., [1896] 2 Q. B. 377, holding, as
Rights of isurer,
Subrogation,
Remedy Against
Assured

he held, that the insurer can not only recover
from the insured the value of any benefit received by him by way of compensation from

other sources, but also the full value of any rights or remedies
of the insured against third parties which have been renounced
by him, and to which, but for that renunciation, the insurer
would have had a right to be subrogated.
The right surrendered in this case was a covenant in a lease
to lay out insurance moneys received on repairs to the premises
insured. See 35 Am. L. REG. (N. S.) 785.
When a lunatic sets fire to a building, an insurance company, which has paid the loss caused thereby, has a right of
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Subrogation,
Insurance
Company,

Fire Caused
by Lunatic

action against the lunatic's estate, under the subrogation clause of the policy, to recover the
amount so paid; and in such an action the insanity
of the defendant cannot be set up as a defense :

Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of C/tester Co. v. Showalter, (Superior Court
of Pennsylvania,) 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 452.
Judge Collins has also recently held that the general rule of
law, based on mercantile custom, by which the broker, and
not the assured, is liable to the underwriters for
Marine
the premiums on a policy of marine insurance, is
Insurance,
Liability of not limited to the ordinary form of Lloyd's policy,
but extends also to policies containing a promise
on the part of the assured to pay the premiums
:
Universo Ins. Co. of Milan v. Merchants MarineIns Co., [- 8973
Broker for
Premiums

i

Q.

B.

205.

On the trial of an indictment for mutilating and destroying
the books of a corporation with intent to defraud and injure it,
persons related to its stockholders within the
Jurors,
Competency, prohibited degree are not competent to serve as
Relationship jurors; and in determining whether or not a new
trial should be granted to the accused on the ground of
relationship between jurors and stockholders, the fact that the
former, at the time of the trial, were ignorant of any relationship between themselves and some of the stockholders is
immaterial: McElhannon v. State, (Supreme Court of Georgia,)
26 S. E. Rep. 501.
In Sanborn v. FirstNall. Bk. of Greeley, (Court of Appeals
of Colorado,) 47 Pac. Rep. 66o, an attempt was 'made to
a post-office: and several
Landiord and change the location of
persons occupying property adjacent to its then
Tenant,
Assignmentof location, and wishing it to remain there, agreed to
Reversion,
Appurte-

nancs

pay a certain sum annually to the owner of the
premises occupied by it, or his assigns, in con-

sideration that he would lease the premises to the government
for a term of five years at an inadequate rental. The lessor
subsequently assigned all his right, title and interest in the
lease to another; and thereafter assigned all his property for
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the benefit of creditors. The assignee brought suit to recover
the sums due under the agreement; and the bank contended
that the assignment of the lease carried with it the right to
receive the annual payments. The lower court found for the
defendant on this ground; but the Court of Appeals reversed
that decision, holding that the agreement did not create the
relation of landlord and tenant, and that therefore the right to
receive payments under it did not pass by a conveyance of the
premises as appurtenant to the land.
An article addressed to the proprietor of a medicine, published in a newspaper, stating that "Your advertisements will
not be received in the columns of the 'Landwirth,'
LIbel
although you offer us big pay. We have
repeatedly advised our readers that by the manufacture and sale
of such medicines the public are swindled out of their money.
' Der Landwirth' does not work in this way, but, on the contrary, desires to be to its readers a sincere and faithful adviser," is libelous per se: De Szoop Family Medicine Co. v.
Wernik, (Supreme Court of Wisconsin,) 7o N. W. Rep. i6o.
In Comfort v. Young, 69 N. W. Rep. 1032, the Supreme
Court of Iowa recently held, that when an information chargCharge of ing insanity, filed with the board of commissioners
Insanity
of insanity, is not well grounded, the person who
filed it is responsible in an action for libel, unless he acted in
good faith, and upon probable cause.
There is an article on the question of the imputation of
insanity as a cause of action for libel, in 30 Ai. L. REG. (N. S.)
389.
In a case lately decided by the House of Lords, Nevill v.
Fine Art & Gen. Is. Co., Ltd., [1897] A. C. 68, affirming
[1895] 2 Q. B. 156, the plaintiff had acted for
Privileged
Cornsome time as agent of the defendant company at
munication his own offices. After some correspondence as to
a change of terms, on which the parties could not agree, the
secretary of the defendant sent to persons who insured through
the plaintiff a circular stating that the agency of the plaintiff
at his offices "had been closed by the directors."
The
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plaintiff then brought an action for libel against the company. On the trial the judge ruled that the statement was
capable of a defamatory meaning, but that the occasion was
privileged. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, that the
statement was a libel, that it was untrue, and that the defendant had exceeded its privilege, but did not find actual malice.
Judgment was entered thereon.
From this the defendant
appealed; and both the Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords held that judgment should be given for the company,
on the ground that the statement was not capable of a defamatory meaning, that it was true, that the occasion was privileged, that the finding of the jury as to excess of privilege was
insufficient, and that there was no evidence of malice for the
jury.

The Supreme Court of Iowa, adopting the rule supported
by the weight of authority, holds that in an action for maliMalicious

cious prosecution, the fact that the examining

Prosecution,
Want of Probable Cause,
Discharge by
Examining

magistrate discharged the plaintiff without evi-

Magistrate

lishing probable cause on the defendant; and that

Y

dence in his behalf is primnafacie evidence of want
of probable cause, throwing the burden of estab-

when the burden of proof is thus cast upon the defendant, it is
error to direct a verdict for him: Hidy v. Murray, 69 N. W.

Rep. I 138.
In a prosecution for a violation of the Factory and Workshop Acts of England of 1878, s. 5, sub-s. 3, and 189i, s. 6,
Msterand sub-s. 2, which provide that "all dangerous parts
Servant,
of the machinery" in a factory "shall either be
Dangerous
Machinery,
Duty to Fence

securely fenced or be in such position or of such
construction as to be equally safe to every person

employed in the factory as it would be if it were securely
fenced," the occupier of a cotton factory was summoned before
the justices of the borough of Blackburn for neglecting to
fence the shuttles of his looms. It appeared that shuttles do
occasionally, during the process of weaving, fly out of the
shuttle-race, (the bed upon which they slide to and fro,) under
circumstances which render them dangerous to any persons
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who happen to be in the line of flight. The flying out of the
shuttles may be caused by the defective condition of the
shuttles, the negligence of the weaver in charge of the
machine, or by reason of some foreign substance getting
accidentally into the shuttle-race, or by a defect in the yarn;
but in any case it is of rare occurrence. (In the establisment
in question, which contained 1400 looms, but four serious
accidents happened from this cause in as many years.) The
justices convicted the defendant; but the recorder quashed
the conviction on appeal, subject to a case stated for the
Queen's Bench Division. That court adopted the conclusion
of the justices, holding that the obligation to fence under the
act cited was not confined to machinery which was dangerous
in itself in the ordinary course of careful working; and that
the shuttles, even though not in themselves defective, were
" dangerous parts of the machinery," if any of the other
enumerated causes of their flying out of the shuttle-race were
likely to occur with any degree of frequency; and accordingly
remitted the case to the quarter sessions : Windle v. Birtwhistle, [1897] i Q. B. 192.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently decided a.
very interesting question in the law of negligence. The
Negligence of defendant employed a man to drive his cart, with
Servant,
instructions not to leave it, and a boy, who had
Liability of

nothing to do with the driving, to go in the cart
and deliver parcels to the defendant's customers. The driver
left the cart, with the boy in it, and went into a house. While
the driver was absent the boy drove on, and came into collision
with the plaintiff's carriage. The plaintiff sued the defendant
for the damage caused by the collision; and the court held,
on appeal, that there is no rule of law that will prevent a
master being liable for negligence of his servant, in consequence
of which a third person is given opportunity to commit a
wrongful or negligent act immediately producing the damage
complained of; that it is in each case a question of fact
whether the original negligence was an effective cause of the
damage; and that in this case the negligence of the driver in
leaving the cart was the effective cause of the damage, and
Master
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the defendant was liable: Englehart v. Farrant, [1897] I
Q. B. 240.
When a contract provides that the work .shall be done
under "the immediate supervision " of the architect, and that
Mechanics'
payment shall be made on the architect's certifiLiens,
cates, the owner is not bound by certificates
Architect's
Certificates

issued, in the absence of the architect, by one to
whom he had attempted to delegate his authority: Monahan
v. Fitzgerald,(Supreme Court of Illinois,) 45 N. E. Rep. 10 13.

Private by-laws of a Masons' and Builders' Association, the
membership in which includes sixty out of seventy or seventyMonopolies,

five mason contractors in a city, requiring the

Restraint of
Trade

members to pay to the association six per cent. on
all contracts taken by them, and to submit all bids

for work first to the association, and providing that the lowest
bidder shall add six per cent. to his bid before it is submitted
to the owner or his architect, are contrary to public policy,
and void; and a note given by a building contractor to such
an association, of which he was a member, for, the percentage
due under the by-laws on a contract for building, is invalid,
and will not be enforced: Milwaukee ffasons' & Builders' Assn.
v. Niezerowski, (Supreme Court of Wisconsin,) 7o N. W. Rep.
166.
A city, which has authority under its charter to regulate
the use of the public streets and highways, can enact an
ordinance to compel passenger cars operated by
Municipal
Corporations, trolley or electric power to come to a full stop
Regulation of
Street
Railways

before crossing intersecting streets; and such an
ordinance, if enacted in the manner prescribed by

the charter of the city, is legislative in its character, and wil
not be set aside as unreasonable in its purpose or effect: Cape
May, D. B. & S. P. R. R. Co. v. City of Cape May, (Supreme
Court of New Jersey,) 36 Atl. Rep. 678; State v. City of Cape
May, (Supreme Court of New Jersey,) 36 AtI. Rep. 679.
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Guardians of the poor are not answerable in damages in
their corporate capacity for injuries caused by the
ouarians negrligence of their officials in the treatment of

Negligence,

of the Poor,

poor patients received into workhouse hospitals:
Dunbar v. The Guardians of the Poor of the Ardee Union,
(Court of Appeal of Ireland,) [1897] 2 I. R. 76.
In a case recently decided by the Supreme Court of British
Columbia, Canadian Pac. R. R. Co. v. Parke, 33 Can. L. J.
213, it appeared that the defendants owned a lot
Negligence,
Reasonable of ground near the Thompson River, which they
Use of
Legal Right, irrigated for agricultural purposes, under statutory
Inlunction authority. Without irrigation the land would
Liability

have been worthless. The soil was gravelly and porous, and
in consequence of this the water percolated through, causing
.the land to slip, and thus pushing out of place the rails of the
plaintiff's road, which ran between the defendant's land and
the river. The plaintiff asked for an injunction to restrain the
defendants from causing it further damage by irrigating their
.land; but this was refused, on the ground that the legislature,
in authorizing the bringing of water on the lands for agricultural purposes, must be taken to have contemplated the mis'chief which might arise from a reasonable use of that power,
and to have condoned it.
When a person stands so near to a railroad track that he is
drawn under the wheels by the suction of a passing train, the
question of his contributory negligence s for the
Negligence,
Contributory, jury; and it is error for the court to charge, as
Question for matter of law, either that he was guilty of conJr
tributory negligence, or that he was free from
negligence, if he stood far enough from the track to avoid
being struck by the train : Graney v. St. L., 0. H11.
& S. Ry. Co.,
(Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. I,) 38 S. W. Rep. 969.
In Industrial Bank of Chicago v. Bowes, 46 N. E. Rep. IO,
the Supreme Court of Illinois lately ruled, reversing 64 Ill.
App. 300, that an architect's certificate, reciting
Negotiable
Instrument, that a certain amount was due the contractor, and
Cheque,

What
Constitutes

indorsed by the owner with an order to a firm
that had loaned him money wherewith to carry
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on the building, the funds loaned remaining in the hands of
the lender, to be paid out as required in the construction of
the building, was a cheque, and not a bill of exchange.
In a recent case in the House of Lords, Clutton v. Attenborough, [1897] A. C. 9 o , a clerk in the account department
of the plaintiffs, by fraudulently representing to
Cheques
Payable to
them that work had been done on their account
Fictitious

Person
by B., induced them to draw cheques payable to,
the order of B., in payment for the pretended work. There
was in fact no such person as B. The cheques, when signed
by the plaintiffs were sent by them to the account department
for postage. The clerk. obtained possession of the cheques,
indorsed them in B.'s name, and negotiated them with the
defendants, who gave value for them in good faith. The
cheques were paid to the defendants by the plaintiffs' bankers.
After the plaintiffs discovered the fraud they sued the defendants to recover the amount of the cheques as money paid
under mistake of fact. Upon these facts their Lordships held,
affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal, [1895] 2 Q. B.
707, which affirmed that of Wills, J., [1895] 2 Q. B. 303, that
the cheques were "issued" within the meaning of the Bills of
Exchange Act, 1882, s. 2; that B. was a "fictitious or nonexisting person" within the meaning of S. 7, sub-s. 3 of that
act, which provides that " where the payee is a fictitious or
non-existent person, the bill may be treated as payable to
bearer," although the plaintiffs believed and intended the
cheques to be payable to the order of a real person; that the
cheques might therefore be treated as payable to bearer; and
that the plaintiffs could not maintain their action, as the
defendants were holders in good faith and for value.
In Ogston v. Aberdeen District Tramways Co., [1897] A. C.
i i i, the House of Lords recently decided that a
Nuisance,
Street
street railway company, which after each heavy
Railroads,
Melting Snow fall of snow cleared its tracks by a snow-plow and
by Salt
then scattered salt along the rails and adjacent
thereto, but did not remove the briny slush thus produced,
should be enjoined from continuing the practice.
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The Supreme Court of Texas holds, that, independent of
Partition, statute, equity has jurisdiction to order property
Jurisdictionof to be sold for partition, when found incapable
of division in kind without serious injury to the
Equity
interests of the parties: Moore v. Blagge, 38 S. W. Rep. 979.
In Polts v. Schmucker, (Court
36 AtI. Rep. 592, a member of a
Partnership, another business under
all the stock himself,
Creditors,

of Appeals of Maryland,)
banking firm engaged in
a corporate name, owning
He
except four shares.

One Man

conducted the business, and owned all the assets
of the concern. The corporation was indebted to the bank
for money lent. The bank became insolvent, and the corporation went into the hands of a receiver. Under the circumstances it was held, that as the owner of the corporation was
a member of the bank, the latter was not entitled to share in
the assets of the corporation until its other creditors had been
paid.
Company

The Supreme Court of Ohio has lately, in accord with the
authorities, upheld the validity of the release of liability for
of a railroad relief
Release and injuries given by the members
were
as follows: The
The
facts
department.
Discharge,
Railroad
plaintiff, an employe of the company, voluntarily,
Relief
Association,
Validity

and with full knowledge of the character and
effect of the contract he was assuming, applied

for admission to a voluntary relief association, of which the
company was a member, contributing large sums to its treasury. His application contained an agreement that the company might deduct from his wages a specified sum per
month, in order to form, with other like contributions of the
other members, and certain contributions which the company
bound itself to make, a relief fund for the benefit of the employs members in case of sickness, accident, or death; and a
further agreement that in case of accident the acceptance by
him of relief from the relief fund so accumulated should operate as a release of the company from liability for damages.
The court held (i) That such a contract is not prohibited by
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the act of Ohio of April 2, 1890, (87 Ohio Laws, 149,)
which provides that "no railroad company, insurance society
or association or any other person shall demand, accept,
require or enter into any contract, agreement, stipulation with
any person about to enter or in the employ of any railroad
company, whereby such person stipulates or agrees to surrender or waive any right to damages against any railroad
company, thereafter arising for injury or death, or whereby he
agrees to surrender or waive in case he asserts the same, any
other right whatsoever," since the contract in question does
not waive any right, but expressly reserves it, merely giving
the plaintiff an election of remedies after the injury, and providing that the choice of one shall be a waiver of the other;
(2) That such a contract is not contrary to public policy;
(3) That it does not lack mutuality; and (4) That it is based
upon a valid consideration : Pittsburgk, C., C. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Cox, 45 N. E. Rep. 641. See 34 Am. L. REG. N. S.
231.

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
California, a person who receives compensation for reporting
an offense cannot thereafter procure the conviction
Reward,
Apportionof the offender, and claim for that service a reward
ment
offered for the "arrest and conviction" of such
offender, since the reward cannot be apportioned, and the
acceptance of pay for the detection defeats a recovery for the
conviction: Van Horn v. Ricks Water Co., 47 Pac. Rep. 361.
In United States v. Harris,(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit,) 77 Fed. Rep. 821, it appeared that one Harris was
set-off,
arrested upon a charge of obtaining money from
United States postmasters upon forged money orders, and was
Government,

Money

Fraudulently
Obtained from

convicted on that charge. While in custody,
before conviction, he was searched by a post-

Postmaster office inspector, and a sum of money was taken
from his person, which was afterwards deposited in the
treasury of the United States. Harris sued the government
to recover the money so taken. The court below ruled that
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he was entitled to recover, but the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed this decision in part, declaring that although the
money taken from Harris was not identified as the same
money obtained by his forgeries, and although the postmasters, and not the government, were responsible for the
money paid on the forged orders, the government could claim
as a set-off to the plaintiff's demand, the amount of any
moneys clearly shown to have been fraudulently obtained by
him from the postmasters.
The Supreme Court of Texas has declared that the doctrine
of stare decisis does not require that a prior decision, in contravention of the constitution, should be followed;
Stare
and that the decision of a court is not "a law"
Decisls,
Constitutional within the meaning of the provision of the United
Law

States constitution which prohibits the states
from passing any law impairing the obligations of contracts,
so that the subsequent overruling of a decision, in reliance
whereon contracts have been made, does not violate that
provision: Storrie v. Cortes, 38 S. W. Rep. 154.
In Shields v. Howard,[i897] i Q. B. 84, Judge Grantham,
of the Queen's Bench Division, lately held, that under the act
of 27 & 28 Vict. c. 55, § i, which provides that
Street
musicians, "any householder within the inetropolitan district,
Right of
Householder . . . may require any street musician or street
to Compel
Departure

singer to depart from the neighborhood of the

house of such householder on account of the ill-

ness or on account of the interruption of the ordinary occupations or pursuits of any inmate of such house, or for other
reasonable or sufficient cause," and imposes a penalty for
refusal to depart when so required, the householder making
the requisition must give to the street musician or singer his
reasons for making it.
The Court of Appeals of New York has recently delivered
itself of an opinion which will prove of great interest to the
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public, involving, as it does, the disputed question
of the reasonableness of a tender of fare on a
street-car. The plaintiff had in his possession no
smaller amount of money than a five-dollar bill.
ness
He tendered this to the conductor, who
said, "I
am not supposed to change it; you must get off."
The
plaintiff replied, "I won't get off. You must put me off."
The conductor did so, using no unnecessary violence; and
the plaintiff sued for damages for the technical assault. It
was agreed that the defendant had a rule, (not brought to the
plaintiff's notice,) requiring conductors to furnish change to
the amount of two dollars, but that there was no rule forbidding conductors to make change for a larger amount. There
was no evidence of a custom on the part of plaintiff or of the
public of tendering to the defendant five dollars in payment of a
five cent fare, and receiving the change, but the plaintiff testified that on a former occasion, and on another line, he had
offered a five-dollar bill for his fare, and that it had been.
changed for him. Upon this state of facts, the court held that
the tender was unreasonable, as a matter of law, and that the
plaintiff could not recover: Barker v. CentralPark N. & E.
Street
Railroad,
Fare,
Tender,
Reasonable-

R. R. Co., 45 N. E. Rep. 550.

It is a question for the jury whether a passenger, who, in
the absence of a rule forbidding it, rides on the front platform
Electric Cars,
Contributory
Negligence

of an electric car, as he and others have been

accustomed to ride, and where his fare is taken
without objection, is guilty of such negligence as

to preclude his recovery for injuries received in a collision
with another car: Bailey v. Tacoma Traction Co., (Supreme
Court of Washington,) 47 Pac. Rep. 241.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has joined the ranks of
those who hold that when a passenger alights from a street
Alighting

Passengers
Crossing
Tracks

car, and in attempting to cross the street behind
it is struck by a car coming up on the other
track, which he might have seen if he had looked,.

he is guilty of contributory negligence which will
bar his recovering for injuries received: Balimore Tractioit
Co. v. Helms, 36 Atl. Rep. i 19. The court is very careful to.
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cite all the authorities supporting its view, but ignores those
which hold a contrary doctrine. See 35 Am. L. REG.
(N. S.) 532, 794Owners of a linotype machine, with which they make linotypes for the publication of newspapers or books, are not
manufacturers of machinery, so as to be exempt
Taxation,
Exemption of
from taxation under a constitutional provision
Manufacturers exempting such manufacturers: Nicholson v.
Board of Assessors, (Supreme Court of Louisiana,)

21

So.

Rep. 167.
Two persons unlawfully racing their horses together on a
street are jointly liable to a third person who attempts to
cross in front of them, and without fault on his
Torts,
Joint Tort
part is run against and injured by one of them, if,
Fpasors,
but for the race, there would have been no accident: Hanrahan v. Cochran, (Supreme Court of
New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department,) 42 N.Y.

Suppl. 1031.
The same court has lately held, that a wife, who has been
decreed alimony, pending divorce proceedings, can maintain
an action against one who has induced and aided
Prevenfing
Enforcement her lhusband to leave the state, in order to avoid
of Pecree the payment of the alimony, as
to which he was
then in default: Hoefler v. Hoefler, 42 N. Y. Suppl. 1035.

In a recent suit in a federal court to restrain the defendant
from selling goods in packages similar to those of the cornTrademark, plainant, where the defendant's packages resemSimulation
bled those of the complainant in numerous parPackages,

ticulars besides those of size, color and form, it
was held that an injunction should be granted restraining the
sale of that particular form of package, or any other form
which, by reason of the collocation of size, shape, color, lettering, spacing and ornamentation, might present a general
appearance as closely resembling complainant's packages as the
Injunction

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

one complained of, but that a clause should be added to the
effect that the injunction should not be construed as preventing
the sale of packages of the size, weight, shape or color of complainant's package, provided that they were so differentiated
in general appearance as not to be calculated to deceive the
ordinary purchaser: N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell Mfg.
Co., (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,) 77 Fed. Rep.
869.
This case stands in marked contrast to that of Lafean v.
Weeks, 177 Pa. 412. 36 AM. L. REG. (N. S.).
The rule permitting the owner of a fund, which has been
misappropriated by one who held it in trust or for a specific
purpose, to follow the trust property into the
Trusts,
Following hands of the trustee, or of a receiver, in case of
Trust Funds,
Limitation of
Rule

insolvency, only permits the owner to pursue the
fund in kind, or in specific property into which it

has been converted, or, if the fund has been mingled with other
property of the trustee, to establish a charge on the mass of
that property for the amount of such fund, and does not give
the owner of the fund any rights, in preference to other
creditors of the trustee, in property into which the trust fund
has in no way entered: Met. Nat. Bk. of Kansas City, Mo. v.
Campbell Commission Co., (Circuit Court, W. D. Missouri,
W. D.,) 77 Fed. Rep. 705.
When the income of a fund bequeathed by a testator is, by
the terms of the will, to be "deposited" in the hands of his
executors for the benefit of his daughter during
Trust
For Support, her life, to be invested, and the income paid over
Spendthrift
Trust

to her, without any provision against anticipation
or alienation, the fact that it is stated to be "for her support"
will not make it a spendthrift trust, and the same will be subject to the payment of her debts: Young v. Easley, (Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia,) 26 S. E. Rep. 401.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas, Lottman Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Houston Waterworks Co.,
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Water
Companies,

Liabilty for
Failure to

38 S. W. Rep. 357, a water company which has
contracted to supply a private corporation with
water in case of a fire, in consideration

of an

Furnish

annual rental, is liable for its failure to do so to

Water

the extent of such damage as may
be proved to

arise from such failure as the proximate cause.

When the water of a spring flows through a definite
channel, or by percolation, into a running stream, of which
*atjrsajui it is the chief source of supply, an injunction will
Waterlie at the suit of a prior appropriator of the water
courses,

Diversion of
Spring

rights in that stream, to restrain a diversion of the

water of the spring by the owner of the land on

which it is situated: Bruening v. .Derr, (Supreme Court of
Colorado,) 47 Pac. Rep. 290.
In k'Nab v. Robertson, [1897] A. C. 129, the House of
Lords lately held, affirming 33 S. L. R. 497, that the waters
of a spring,
which
do not flow in a defined stream,
Waters in
pint
hi
Watercourses, but ooze through marshy ground into a pond, arePercolating

Waters,
Marshy

percolating waters;

and that a grant of "the

waters in the said pond, and in the streams leadGround
ing thereto" would not preclude the grantor
from
draWing off from this marshy ground the water of the abovementioned spring.

The Probate Division of England has
recently decided two
important cases in respect of testamentary documents. In the
Conditional
first case, In the Goods of SPratt,[1897] P. 28,
Wills
the deceased, a military officer in active service in
New Zealand, in 1864 wrote to his sister a letter, of which the
material part is as follows: "If we remain here taking pahs
for some time to come the chances are in favor of some more
of us being killed, and as I may not have another opportunity of saying what I wish to be done With any little money
I may possess in case of an accident, I wish to make everything I possess over to you. In the first place, there is
money at . . . Keep this until I ask you for it."

The testator
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survived the war, and died in 1896, not having revoked the
disposition made in this letter. The next of kin urged that
this was to be regarded as a conditional will, and therefore
revoked by his survival; but the court held that the disposition of the deceased's property, according to the terms of
the letter, was not dependent on his death while in active service; that the letter was therefore not a conditional will; and
being a good military will, was entitled to probate.
In the other case, Ha/ford v. Haford, [1897] P. 36, the
testator, a Scotchman, by his will gave the residue of his
estate to his wife for life during her widowhood, and in case
of her re-marriage gave her one-third for life, the remainder
to various legatees. There was no disposition of the residue
in the event of her remaining a widow. Subsequently, being
about to sail with his wife from Calcutta to England, the
testator wrote a letter to his brother in England, which was
in form a good testamentary document at Scotch law, and
contained the following language: "If anything happens to
us on the way, my will has been accidentally packed away in
a tin box, to which I cannot now get access, as I forget
which box it has been put into. However, if we both come
to grief, I appoint you my executor; if I only, then in conjunction with Nan." The letter then went on to deal with
the disposition of his estate after his wife's death, in the event
of her surviving him.
Neither the testator nor his wife died
during the voyage. It was argued that this will also was
conditional, and revoked by the safe arrival of the testator;
but the court held that it was a valid testamentary document,
and admitted it to probate as such.
Ardemus Stewart.

